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aBstraCt. earthquakes are the most common natural hazard in new Zealand which can 
affect lifelines in populated areas. this research takes into account earthquake effects on treat-
ment plants and pumping stations in wastewater systems as a lifeline. wastewater treatment 
plants in four earthquake prone areas in new Zealand were selected for the purpose of as-
sessing their vulnerabilities to earthquakes. results showed that simple upgraded wastewater 
treatment plants are the most vulnerable type of wastewater treatment plants in new Zealand. 
earthquake vulnerability of 45 wastewater pumping stations in 3 earthquake prone cities in 
new Zealand was also assessed. the assessment proved that non-structural components are 
among the most vulnerable parts in wastewater pumping stations. since structural vulner-
ability of some wastewater pumping stations is notable, it requires a need for an immediate 
rehabilitation plan.
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1. iNtroDuCtioN
the wastewater system (wws) is one of 
few public facilities which has direct impact on 
communities, especially in concentrated urban 
areas. the malfunction of such a facility rapid-
ly affects a large number of people. wastewa-
ter systems in densely populated areas have 
been designated as lifelines which deserve par-
ticular attention due to their direct impact on 
community health.wastewater system failure 
not only endangers human health, but it can 
also pollute the environment. furthermore, 
earthquakes not only damage wastewater sys-
tems, but also cause water pollution and envi-
ronmental issues due to the direct discharge 
of wastewater in rivers or seas (eeri, 2010; 
tang et al., 2010).
vulnerability in wastewater systems can be 
categorized on the vulnerability of each part 
of the system, including wastewater treatment 
plants (wwtp), wastewater pumping stations 
(wwpss) and pipelines. the vulnerability of 
each WWS component reflects its susceptibility 
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to failure due to damages incurred by an earth-
quake. for instance, if any particular wwps 
cannot pump received wastewater to the des-
ignated outlet due to earthquake caused dam-
age then the wwp will be vulnerable to an 
earthquake. the vulnerability in wwtps can 
be defined as the factors which affect the fail-
ure in the treatment process or the decreasing 
outlet quality of treated wastewater which get 
released to the environment.
the effects of earthquakes on wastewater 
systems both directly and indirectly influence 
human health and environment simultaneous-
ly. direct effects of earthquakes on wastewa-
ter systems are the damages which are caused 
directly due to ground shaking or permanent 
ground movement (heubach, 2002). for in-
stance, direct damages to treatment plants 
or wastewater pumping stations can be both 
structural and non-structural failures on dif-
ferent parts of the system (heubach, 2002). 
indirect damage from an earthquake on waste-
water systems can be caused by a tsunami, 
flood (edwards, 2005) or even a change of 
oceanographic characteristics near the waste-
water treatment plant outlet (Morkoc et al., 
2007). the earthquake vulnerability assess-
ment of new Zealand’s wastewater treatment 
plants and wastewater pumping stations has 
been made as well as suggestions for decrease 
earthquake vulnerability to new Zealand’s 
wastewater systems. 
2. earthquaKe effeCts oN 
wastewater systeMs
earthquake effects on recently upgraded 
treatment plants during two main earth-
quakes in us and taiwan have shown how the 
loss of power significantly affects wastewater 
systems, particularly pumping stations (lund 
et al., 1998; schiff and tang, 2000). however, 
treatment plants that had been upgraded and 
constructed with new building codes withstood 
the earthquakes well with only minor damages. 
the san Jose wastewater treatment facilities 
and the watsonville primary wastewater treat-
ment plant were examples of two earthquake 
resistant plants in the 1989 loma prieta earth-
quake (lund et al., 1998). no structural dam-
age was reported for the alvarado wastewater 
treatment plant, south Bay side, scott valley 
wastewater treatment plants and santa cruz 
regional wastewater treatment plant (lund et 
al., 1998). Most of the wastewater treatment 
plants in the earthquake impacted areas dur-
ing the 1989 earthquake had been upgraded 
with new buildings and structural codes before 
the earthquake (lund et al., 1998). 
according to the 1995 nceer report, the 
higashinda wastewater treatment plant, the 
greatest wastewater treatment plant in the 
1995 kobe earthquake affected area, was 
severely damaged (nceer, 1995). lateral 
ground deformation and differential settle-
ment caused severe damage in the plant. the 
earthquake affected facilities located in the 
plant such as building equipment, pipes and 
all other relevant facilities. the earthquake 
also affected most of the wastewater pump-
ing station, damaging 20 of the 23 pumping 
stations. The most significant damage to the 
pumping station was power outage, however 
after power restoration, most of the ww pump-
ing stations started working despite reports of 
building structure damage and caisson dam-
age (nceer, 1995).
the wastewater treatment plants and 
wastewater pumping stations suffered minor 
damages by the 1999 taiwan earthquake, how-
ever power outage proved to be the most sig-
nificant effect on industrial treatment plants 
and wwpss (schiff and tang, 2000). the 1995 
Northridge earthquake did not cause signifi-
cant and notable damage in wwtps, however 
commercial power outage affected 54 wwpss 
in the affected areas (Moehle, 1995; schiff, 
1995).
the 1999 turkey earthquake caused severe 
damages to the local water and wastewater 
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system especially in the areas affected by 
ground settlement (Bendimerad et al., 2000). 
however after the earthquake, the izmit 
wastewater treatment plant was closed due to 
the heavy damage of mechanical equipment 
(erdik, 1999). wastewater systems suffered 
intensive damage in the 2010 chile earth-
quake. earthquake damage was extended into 
wastewater treatment plants, large diameter 
interceptor pipes and small diameter connec-
tion pipes (eeri, 2010; tang et al., 2010).
during the 1987 edgecombe earthquake in 
nZ, wastewater pumping stations with sub-
mersible pumps did not suffer damage and 
the wastewater treatment plants in whakata-
ni and edgecumbe stood well (Butcher et al., 
1998). the 2007 gisborne earthquake caused 
minor damage to mechanical parts in some 
wastewater pumping stations (rentoul, 2008). 
the wastewater treatment plant and wastewa-
ter pumping stations continued working with-
out major damages in the ormond earthquake 
of 1993 (read and sritharan, 1993). 
edward (2005) revealed that indirect dam-
age of earthquakes can even be flood damages 
created by tsunami waves. for instance, dur-
ing the 2004 tsunami in thailand, treatment 
plants and pumping stations flooded which 
caused the whole wastewater system to fail 
(edwards, 2005). another example of indirect 
impact of earthquake on wastewater systems 
is the change of oceanographic characteristics 
near wastewater treatment plant outlets. the 
ocean pollution in izmit bay was an instance 
of such indirect impact after the 1999 turkey 
earthquake (Morkoc et al., 2007). in the 1931 
napier earthquake of new Zealand, the in-
ner harbour floor uplifted and the tidal cur-
rent force decreased. inadequate tidal current 
had caused the accumulation of sewage solids 
near the harbour entrance. furthermore, the 
consumption of contaminated shellfish caused 
some outbreak of typhoid after the earthquake 
(napier city council, 2008). 
the above case studies show that earth-
quakes usually caused minor damages to 
wastewater treatment plants and waste-
water pumping stations despite the severe 
earthquake effects on wastewater treatment 
plants in the 1995 Japan and the 2010 chile 
earthquakes. the liquefaction and permanent 
ground deformation were the two main causes 
of severe damage as a result from such earth-
quakes. the main problem reported for treat-
ment plants and pumping stations was power 
outage. in order to demonstrate the vulnerabil-
ity of wastewater treatment plants and pump-
ing stations to earthquakes in new Zealand, 
four wastewater treatment plants including 45 
wastewater pumping stations were taken into 
account.
3. neW zeaLanD treatment 
plaNts aND earthquaKe 
VulNeraBility
each city in new Zealand with a population 
greater than 30000 has at least one wastewa-
ter treatment plant. wastewater treatment 
plants (wwtp) in new Zealand vary from 
simple treatment plants (gisborne wwtp) to 
the most complicated treatment plants (wel-
lington and auckland wwtp). in this study 
the WWTPs were classified into three main 
groups: advanced technology wastewater 
treatment plants (wellington and hutt city), 
simple milli-screening wwtp (gisborne) and 
simple milli-screening with ponds wwtp 
(Blenheim).
the wellington wwtp was built in 1998 
while the hutt city wwtp was commissioned 
in 2001 (capacity-co., 2004). Blenheim treat-
ment plant upgrading is under construction, 
whereas construction of gisborne’s treatment 
plant will be started in the near future (gis-
borne District Council, 2009). The first Hutt 
city treatment plant was established in 1982, 
was upgraded and restarted operation in 2001. 
although the initial treatment plant in hutt 
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city comprised of a screening unit, the post-
upgrade was classified as an advance WWTP 
with several treatment processes (capacity-
co., 2004).
some regional wastewater systems still rely 
on simple treatment systems that only filter 
collected wastewater and release it to nature. 
Gisborne’s wastewater milli filtering station is 
an example of a simple WWTP that only fil-
ters collected wastewater and releases it to the 
harbour, although the design of a new treat-
ment plant is in progress. the napier waste-
water treatment plant is another example of 
simple wastewater treatment plant (wwtp) 
which entails milli-screening of the collected 
wastewater and pumping to hawke’s Bay via a 
1600 metre of outfall marine pipeline (napier 
city council, 2008). the Blenheim wwtp is 
another example of simple wwtp which ef-
fluent after milli-screening is transferred to 
ponds for further treatment. 
wastewater treatment plants located in 
main cities in new Zealand usually include 
similar components. common features in nZ’s 
wwtps include pumping stations, sedimenta-
tion tanks, reactors, clarifiers, micro-filtration 
units, ultra violet disinfection parts, storage 
buildings, labs, administration buildings, dis-
charge pipelines and outlet points. simple 
wwtps are located in small cities and usually 
comprise of simple filtration units and pump-
ing stations. different sources of wastewater 
in various cities lead to a variety of treat-
ment processes, although treatment plants 
in nZ normally have different capacities 
and layouts with common main components. 
wwtps in the earthquake prone areas are 
expected to withstand particular earthquakes 
hence each part of it should resist earthquake 
forces. each wwtp is a combination of vari-
ous types of building and apparatus which 
should be able to operate simultaneously. if 
the administrative buildings and their facili-
ties suffer an earthquake and are not to be 
used, the whole system will be affected. for 
instance, water system recovery was delayed 
in the 1985 Mexico city, 1991 philippines, 
1995 kobe and 2001 nisqually earthquakes 
because of administrative building damages 
caused by the earthquakes (heubach, 2002). 
each part of the treatment plant has a par-
ticular vulnerability to an earthquake which 
can be affected differently (heubach, 2002). 
for instance, seiche should be considered in 
sedimentation tanks and clarifiers in which 
all mechanical equipment housed in them be 
designed to tolerate the wave effect caused by 
earthquakes (Heubach, 2002). Clarifier struc-
tures are usually resistant to ground shaking 
or ground movement. however, sloshing can 
damage them, for instance sloshing damaged 
clarifiers in the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake 
(heubach, 2002). structural design codes for 
wwtp should conform with nationally recog-
nized codes (vesilind, 2003). local earthquake 
codes should be up to date with new design 
criteria while earthquake codes should cover 
all buildings and structures.
wwtp vulnerability in nZ can be divided 
into the vulnerability of recently upgraded or 
constructed modern treatment plants located 
in populated regions and the vulnerability of 
simple treatment plants in small cities. power 
outage after an earthquake is the most nota-
ble susceptibility in both types of wastewater 
treatment plants. all visited wastewater treat-
ment plants have a power generator in the 
case of an emergency outage, although in large 
scale earthquakes which power transmission 
lines can be suffered significantly, emergency 
generators would not be able to produce suf-
ficient power to run all systems during the 
power recovery period. high demand for elec-
tricity in different sections of wwtps, particu-
larly in uv disinfection units make wwtps in 
populated regions more vulnerable to a power 
outage, in contrast with other smaller waste-
water treatment plants. power outage is the 
most significant vulnerability in WWTP’s of 
nZ’s large cities. due to such power outages, 
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enormous amounts of untreated or partially 
treated wastewater can be discharged to the 
environment. therefore environmental pollu-
tion is the most probable consequence of con-
tinuous power shortage in wwtps in new 
Zealand (Bannatyne, 2004).
this study shows that major wwtps in 
new Zealand were built or upgraded recently 
and are complied with the updated earthquake 
building codes. the advanced treatment plants 
in new Zealand such as wellington, hutt city 
and auckland wwtps were built after 1998 
which means construction of the wwtps were 
complied with the recently established building 
codes. the past notable earthquake after 1978 
showed that buildings constructed under the 
nZs 3904 stood well after the earthquakes, al-
though after 1978, the building codes were up-
graded several times and amended before the 
design date of wastewater treatment plants 
(Beattie and thurston, 2006). considering 
the 1992 building code in nZ, where build-
ing behaviour in earthquakes was taken into 
account, and by considering the construction 
and design dates of wwtps in new Zealand, 
advanced wwtps in nZ are not vulnerable to 
earthquakes. as a result, wwtps appear to be 
the least vulnerable component of wastewater 
systems in new Zealand. 
earthquake vulnerability of simple wwtps 
in new Zealand is equal to that of wastewater 
pumping stations. screening units in simple 
wwtp’s were installed during the last two 
decades where new building codes and earth-
quake forces were taken into account in their 
design. the main issue in simple treatment 
plants in new Zealand, such as the ones in 
gisborne and Blenheim, is the vulnerability of 
their wastewater pumping stations.
4. wastewater puMpiNg statioNs 
VulNeraBility to earthquaKes
wastewater systems are designed to trans-
mit wastewater by gravitational force, the 
most reliable and economical way of conveying 
fluids. Economical issues and technical diffi-
culties are the main obstacles to using gravi-
tational force. Burying pipe to gravity flow cost 
more than to construct a wastewater pumping 
stations in terms of technical difficulties and 
environmental effects, especially in some soft 
soils. due to such barriers, pumping stations 
are one of the main parts of each wastewater 
system, particularly in the wastewater reticu-
lation systems (read, 2004). pumping stations 
are also one of the main parts in the treatment 
plant and treated wastewater discharge sta-
tions. the main function of pumping stations 
in sewage reticulation is to transmit sewage 
to the upper levels by means of gravity. in 
some cases, wastewater or treated wastewater 
is completely carried under pressure, powered 
by one or several pumping stations. the 18km 
pressure pipe in the hutt city wastewater sys-
tem is a good instance of the pressure system, 
which carries treated wastewater to the dis-
charge point in wellington harbour (capacity-
co., 2008). 
5. wastewater puMpiNg statioNs 
in neW zeaLanD
various pumping stations were selected 
across three earthquake-prone cities in new 
Zealand to investigate wwpss vulnerability 
to earthquakes. gisborne and hutt city in the 
north island and Blenheim in the south is-
land were the three earthquake-prone regions 
chosen to investigate their wwpss earth-
quake vulnerability. since each case study 
was located across different geological region 
with varying soil types influenced by different 
active faults, each case should experience dif-
ferent earthquake magnitudes. 
hutt city is located inside the southern 
part of the north island and northeast of new 
Zealand’s capital. hutt city can be affected 
by several active faults, wellington fault be-
ing the most significant one which passes from 
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the southwest to northeast of the city. hutt 
city is laid on variable quaternary-age sedi-
ments comprising from soft and loose sediment 
to compact coarser-grained materials. near-
surface soft sediments with thickness greater 
than 10 m are the predominant soil type in 
Hutt City. The Wellington fault has a signifi-
cant effect on the seismic vulnerability of hutt 
city. MMi caused by the fault varies from ix 
to xi whereas peak ground acceleration varies 
from 0.5 to 0.8g (van dissen et at., 1992). 
Blenheim is located in the Marlborough re-
gion, northeast of the south island. it has a 
high level of seismic vulnerability due to the 
close proximity to the wairau and awatere 
faults. Blenheim’s seismic vulnerability can 
also be affected by the Marlborough fault sys-
tem. its surrounding faults can cause earth-
quakes with magnitudes from 6.9 to 7.9 Mw. 
the city can experience an earthquake every 
28-51 years although the average time be-
tween earthquakes due to the two main faults 
is 350 to 950 years. an earthquake magnitude 
of 7.5 creates earthquake intensities of vii 
to more than ix and ground acceleration of 
1.4 g (robertson and smith, 2004). Blenheim 
is located on the wairau plain where its soil 
types are a combination of the wairau river 
sediments combined with coastal and lagoon 
deposits, fluvial, swamp deposits and glacial 
outwash gravel.
gisborne is located on the main seismic re-
gion where it can be affected by the subducttion 
of the Pacific Plate and Australian Plate. Three 
active faults in the northwest of gisborne can 
also affect its seismic vulnerability (read and 
sritharan, 1993). the 1993 and 2007 earth-
quakes of gisborne were the direct cause of 
the subduction of the Pacific Plate (François-
holden et al., 2008). gisborne is located on 
young, soft and consolidated sediments (Bevin, 
2000). the city is laid on holocene sediment 
which is created by flooding and sea level fluc-
tuating. people living in gisborne should ex-
pect 13 earthquakes with magnitudes greater 
than 4 within 100 km of gisborne annually 
(webb et al., 1985). gisborne can experience 
earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 
MMi=viii every 200 years and earthquakes 
greater than MMi=ix every 1000 years.
19, 13 and 20 wwpss in Blenheim, gis-
borne and hutt city were selected respectively 
to show how vulnerable wwpss are. wwpss’ 
vulnerability to earthquakes in each city was 
classified and investigated. The following ob-
servations are the result of site visiting, tech-
nical interviewing and data analysing done by 
the authors in 2008 and 2009. 
new Zealand’s wastewater pumping sta-
tions are classified into two main groups: dry-
well wwpts and wet-well wwpss. pumps 
in dry well wwpts are located in separate 
underground structures whereas in wet-well 
wwpss submersible pumps are installed in-
side the reservoir. usually, wastewater pump-
ing stations which were built before 1966 are 
drywell pumping stations. for instance, all 
8 wastewater pumping stations built before 
1966 in gisborne are dry-well wwpss (gis-
borne district council, 2008). wwpss earth-
quake vulnerability was divided into two main 
groups: structural vulnerability and non struc-
tural vulnerability. to evaluate wwpss struc-
tural vulnerability, wwpss were split into two 
main sets: wwpss with above ground building 
and wwpss without above ground building.
this research showed buildings of wwpss 
mounted on top of under-ground structures 
(usually in dry-well wwpss) house all elec-
tronic equipment including control boards, tel-
ecommunication and data transferring devices. 
the wwps building is also the access point 
to the dry well for maintenance. during the 
development of the cities, remote controlling 
and telecommunication devices were installed 
in wwpss and mounted on the building walls. 
all relevant data requires wwpss monitor-
ing, including the wastewater level, working 
hours of each pump, the discharge rate and 
the security signals which continuously get 
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recorded and transferred to the control room. 
scada, according to collected data, controls 
the whole wastewater system. failure of any 
installed instrument inside the building makes 
the wwps useless whereas the failure of each 
wwps directly affects the whole wastewater 
reticulation system. furthermore, the wwps’s 
building is the access point to the underground 
structure which includes pumps, valves and 
piping. the building collapse not only affects 
whole systems function but also hinders repair 
processes of affected wwpss. Building vulner-
ability in the wastewater pumping stations 
was taken into account as a main susceptible 
factor. 
various parameters were taken into consid-
eration to demonstrate earthquake vulnerabil-
ity of wwpss’ building. for the assessment of 
wwpss vulnerability, building characteris-
tics, (such as age, type) including geological 
and geotechnical characteristics (such as soil 
type, liquefaction susceptibility), were applied 
to reveal the wwpss’ building vulnerability to 
earthquakes (see Building act, 2004; stand-
ards new Zealand, 2004; nZsee, 2006). the 
latest earthquake vulnerability assessment of 
buildings in nZ has been applied to accurate 
initial assessments (nZsee, 2006). Building 
age is one of the main factors which increase 
building vulnerability in face of earthquakes 
(nZsee, 2006).
various building codes have been developed 
in new Zealand to satisfy required standards 
during urban area development. the first 
building code was established in 1935 and re-
newed several times to decrease its deficien-
cies (Beattie and thurston, 2006). in order to 
add building material and design criteria to 
the first building code in 1935, several build-
ing codes have been amended. for instance, 
the building codes of 1965, 1976, 1984 and 
1992 added more details to the first NZ build-
ing code of 1935. rather than recommending 
specific material, design and construction, the 
1992 building code outlined the performance 
of buildings during an earthquake. the build-
ing code showed how buildings should react to 
withstand earthquake loads. the 1992 building 
code has since been amended nine times till 
2004. Beattie and thurston (2006) showed that 
the first earthquake building code with sound 
engineering approach was established in 1976. 
Buildings built prior to 1976 may have had 
more vulnerability to earthquakes compared 
to buildings built between 1976 and 1992. al-
though the building were design and construct-
ed according to the 1992 building codes seem to 
withstand earthquakes very well.
regarding the collected data from each city 
council, figure 1 illustrates wwpss age among 
three earthquake-prone cities (hutt city, gis-
borne and Blenheim). as figure 1 shows the 
oldest wwpss belong to the Blenheim waste-
water system although, the percentage of new 
wwpss also belong to Blenheim. this shows 
the development of Blenheim city and the re-
placement of aged wwps’s. about 60% of hutt 
city and Blenheim’s wastewater pumping sta-
tions were built or refurbished before 1976, fol-
lowed by 40% of gisborne’s wwpss. finally, it 
should be summarized that in three selected 
cities in new Zealand, more than 40% of all 
wastewater pumping stations were built before 
1976, which means at least 40% of wastewa-
ter pumping stations buildings should be accu-
rately evaluated for earthquake vulnerability. 
the construction dates in figure 1 represent 
refurbishment date of each pumping stations 
instead of initial construction dates. 
as observed during this research, another 
factor which affects earthquake vulnerability 
of a building is its material type. for instance, 
masonry buildings are the most common build-
ing types in wwpss, although some concrete 
buildings are also available in nZ’s wwpss. 
roofs in the wwpss’ buildings are usually 
concrete slab, wood frame with ceramic tiles 
or steel frames with steel sheets on top. the 
wwpss’ building height varies between 2 and 
2.50 meters except with main wwpss.
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another factor which affects vulnerability 
of wastewater pumping station buildings is the 
irregularity in building plans. Most wwpss’ 
buildings in this study have almost regular 
plans (rectangular plan) but with different 
plan types. for instance, gisborne’s wwpss 
have different types of plans compared with 
Blenheim and hutt city’s wwpss. as ob-
served, circular and hexagonal plans are com-
mon in gisborne’s wastewater reticulation. 
wwps buildings, not including some trunk 
wwpss in hutt city and main wwpss in two 
other cities, have small area sizes while build-
ing area in common wwpss vary between 6 
to 25 square meters. wwpss in gisborne and 
hutt city have greater building area compared 
with Blenheim’s WWPSs. Recent field studies 
showed that superficial physical condition of 
all assessed WWPSs were fine with no sign of 
deterioration or crack on above ground struc-
tures was visually detected. however, con-
crete deterioration in wet well structures has 
been seen in some wwpss. detailed tests and 
analysis should be done to accurately show the 
vulnerability of building structures.  
wastewater pumping stations’ wells in new 
Zealand are usually made by precast concrete 
or cast in place concrete. however in some 
cases, the reservoir wells have been made of 
fibreglass tank. Early wastewater pumping 
stations on the other hand were made by place 
concrete. concrete well deterioration was not 
obvious in the majority of cases at least above 
the reservoir water level. further structural 
evaluation accompanied with some material 
tests are required to accurately evaluate un-
derground ground structure vulnerability to 
ground shaking.
6. iNitial assessMeNt of hutt 
City wwps
regarding the greatest numbers of wwpss 
with buildings in the hutt city wastewater 
system compared with gisborne and Blenhe-
im, initial earthquake assessment procedure 
figure 1. date of construction in three cities’ wastewater pumping stations
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recommended by nZsee (2006) was applied to 
disclose the hutt city wwpss’ building vulner-
ability to earthquakes. the initial construction 
dates of hutt city wwpss in the city waste-
water reticulation were applied in the initial 
assessment procedure because refurbishment 
was only done for mechanical, electrical and 
telecommunication devices. assessment made 
of hutt city wwpss without trunk pumping 
stations showed, 41%, 31.8%, 22.7% and 4.5 % 
of the wwpss were built before 1935, between 
1936 and 1976, between 1977 and 1992, and 
after 1992 respectively. 
the vulnerability assessment methodology 
based on nZsee (2006) comprises of 7 steps 
to fully grade building vulnerability to earth-
quakes. The first step provides general infor-
mation for each pumping station to show build-
ing features. in the second step, baseline per-
cent and new building standard is determined 
by calculating and considering near fault and 
hazard factors, building importance level, re-
turn period scaling factor and ductility scaling 
factor. performance achievement ratio and the 
percentage of new building standard are de-
termined in step 3 and 4 respectively. step 5 
shows if the studies building is an earthquake 
prone building while step 6 reveals earthquake 
risk. finally, the last step provides provisional 
grading for seismic risk of building. 
nZsee (2006) recommends that if the cal-
culated percentage of the new Building stand-
ard (%nBs) for each particular building be less 
than two thirds of the nBs, then the building 
is vulnerable to earthquakes and should be ret-
rofitted. Although the NZ Building Act (2004) 
declares if calculated %nBs be less than one 
third of the new building standard then the 
building is an earthquake prone building.
the nZsee initial assessment requires 
earthquake and geological characteristics of 
the place where pumping station are mounted 
on. geological characteristics of each wwps 
in hutt city including soil types were extract-
ed from the available sources (dellow, 1992; 
van dissen et al., 1992). hutt city wwpss 
GIS data base was applied to find location and 
age of each wwps in the hutt city wastewa-
ter system. liquefaction vulnerability map of 
hutt city was applied to modify calculated 
%nBs for the initial assessment (Mwh, 2005). 
earthquake characteristics of city derived from 
structural design action 2004 (standards new 
Zealand, 2004). 
wwpss structure assessment by the author 
revealed that 57% of the hutt city wwpss 
which were built before 1957 are significantly 
vulnerable to earthquake and should be retro-
fitted according to the 2004 building act. Re-
garding the nZsee (2006) recommendation 
for the retrofitting of buildings, 81% of the 
pumping stations should be renovated with 
new building codes. the assessment showed 
that 19% of existing pumping stations have 
buildings which are able to withstand moder-
ate earthquake shaking. since wwpss, as re-
quired buildings, may be of great concern for 
any specific region, the NZSEE 2006 recom-
mendation seems more reliable and appropri-
ate. 
7. NoN struCtural VulNeraBility 
of wwps
non structural vulnerabilities in the nZ’s 
wwpss were categorized by the authors into 
two main types, including vulnerability of elec-
trical and electronic equipment, and mechani-
cal component vulnerability. regional and 
common wwpss transmit collected waste-
water from each region to main collectors or 
trunks pipeline. these pumping stations usu-
ally house two pumps, two check valves, two 
control valves, flow-meter, pipes and fitting, 
control panels, data transmitting and tel-
ecommunication instruments. alongside the 
mechanical and electrical instruments, each 
pumping station consists of a reservoir to col-
lect and pump wastewater to the designated 
point. under-ground structures in pumping 
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stations usually consist of two wells: dry and 
wet wells, or one wet well. wastewater dis-
charges to the wet well and pumps to the des-
ignated point. dry well in dry-well wwpss 
houses fixed pumps, valves, pipes, fitting and 
access point. in new pumping stations which 
are usually wet-well wwpss, there is no dry 
well. consequently, pumps and piping directly 
are installed in the wet well. fixed pumps in 
dry-well wwpss are replaced by submersible 
pumps in wet-well wwpss which are directly 
installed.
vulnerability of the electrical and electronic 
equipment in wwpss should be taken into ac-
count such as the monitoring and controlling 
devices which control the system. this type 
of vulnerability was divided into two main 
groups of wwpss: wwpss with a building 
and wwpss without a building. wet-well 
wwpss which electrical and electronic equip-
ment is installed in the control panel outside 
wwpss’ buildings are much less vulnerable to 
earthquakes compared with dry-well wwpss. 
wet-well wwpss house all electrical and elec-
tronic equipment in a steel box mounted on 
the concrete pad near the underground struc-
ture, whereas electrical and electronics pan-
els in dry-well wwpss are simply mounted 
on the building walls without adequate fix-
ing supporters. wwpss with building cover 
around half of the wwpss in all three cities 
where inadequate fixing of electrical and elec-
tronic equipment is common to all of them. 
even if building walls are able to stand earth-
quake shaking, the toppling and falling of in-
adequately mounted equipment can cause a 
significant failure in WWPSs during a strong 
earthquake. 
Mechanical equipment, including pumps, 
piping and fitting are the main parts in each 
wwps where their vulnerability can instantly 
affect the whole system function. earthquake 
vulnerability in mechanical parts is divided 
into the pumps’ vulnerability and the piping 
system vulnerability. ground shaking effect 
of an earthquake can be controlled by vibra-
tion isolators in fixed pumps, which were not 
installed in all visited wwpss in the three 
case studies. submersible pumps tolerate 
earthquake effects better than fixed pumps 
and submersible pumps are less vulnerable to 
earthquakes (heubach, 2002; rentoul, 2008). 
check and control valves, particularly heavy 
ones should be fixed properly to the basement 
of the underground structures in wwpss. 
steel strips and proper stands should be ap-
plied to fix valves and pipes in pumping sta-
tions. according to site visiting of more than 
45 wastewater pumping stations in new Zea-
land apart from two main pumping stations, 
had no proper fixing strips the mechanical 
parts. almost all wwpss built after 1995 are 
wet-well wwpss. therefore they do not have 
structural vulnerability and non structural 
components are expected to withstand earth-
quakes. according to the earthquake effects in 
wastewater systems in previous earthquake 
scenarios, recently constructed wwpss should 
stand well during an earthquake, even those 
built as dry-well wwps.
Joints and fitting are usually the most vul-
nerable parts of the wwpss’ piping system 
which can even be affected by a moderate 
earthquake. for instance, the only problem 
reported in the wwpss after the 2007 gis-
borne earthquake was joint leakages in a few 
wwpss (rentoul, 2009). Joints should toler-
ate shaking and displacement caused by earth-
quakes. in earthquake prone areas usually 
flexible joints should be installed to connect 
fittings and valves and pumps to pipes in order 
to tolerate shaking and displacement caused 
by earthquakes. observations of wwpss and 
some potable water pumping stations in the 
three earthquake prone cities in new Zealand 
have revealed fixed joints as the most pre-
dominant type. Only in 2 main WWPSs flex-
ible joints were used to cope with longitudinal 
pipe movement. this type of joint facilitates 
installation and maintenance.
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existence of deteriorated and fragile pipes 
in the under-ground structures of wwpss is 
another source of vulnerability, which weak-
ens in strength during earthquakes. flowm-
eters have been installed in some wwpss to 
monitor wastewater flow. Consequently, the 
old piping system has been renewed with new 
ones. the most popular pipe type, especially in 
the wwpss built before 1995 is the cast iron 
pipe which compared with new pipe types is 
much more brittle and sensitive to shaking.
8. CoNClusioN
wastewater treatment plants in the popu-
lated cities in new Zealand by themselves are 
not vulnerable to earthquakes. power outage 
after major earthquakes is the most significant 
vulnerability in the updated wastewater treat-
ment plants. for instance, uv disinfection 
units require high demand of power, which 
will not be satisfied by an emergency power 
generator. on the other hand, the treatment 
plants’ power generators are not able to sup-
ply power for a long recovery period. power 
shortage directly impacts the whole treatment 
process and decreases the quality of treated 
wastewater. earthquake vulnerability of the 
simple wastewater treatment plants is rel-
evant to wwps vulnerability, located beside 
the treatment unit (usually filtration unit).
wwpss’ earthquake vulnerability in new 
Zealand has direct correlation with the struc-
tural and non-structural vulnerabilities. non 
structural earthquake vulnerability is one 
of the predominant hazards in major earth-
quakes, especially from mechanical parts 
(piping and joints), electronic and electrical 
boards in dry-well wastewater pumping sta-
tions. earthquake vulnerability of wwpss’ 
buildings, particularly those were built before 
1976 is also prominent. similar to wastewater 
treatment plants, most of the wwpss can also 
be severely affected by a power outage due to 
lack of power generators. findings from this 
research show that new Zealand needs to as-
sess the upgrade of wastewater systems with 
a focus on the key vulnerabilities of wwtps 
and wwpss.
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saNtrauKa
nuotekų vaLymo ir pumpavimo Stočių pažeiDžiamumaS per žemėS DrebėjimuS
Mohammad reza zare, suzanne wilKiNsoN, regan potaNgaroa
Naujojoje Zelandijoje žemės drebėjimai yra labiausiai tikėtina stichinė nelaimė, apgyvendintose teritorijose 
galinti paveikti gyvybiškai svarbius tinklus. Šiame tyrime nagrinėjamas žemės drebėjimų poveikis nuotekų 
tinkluose veikiančioms valymo ir pumpavimo stotims, kurios yra gyvybiškai svarbios. Siekiant įvertinti, kaip 
žemės drebėjimai gali pažeisti nuotekų valymo stotis, buvo pasirinktos valymo stotys iš keturių seismiškai 
aktyvių Naujosios Zelandijos zonų. Rezultatai parodė, kad Naujojoje Zelandijoje labiausiai pažeidžiamos 
paprastos atnaujintos nuotekų valymo stotys. Įvertintas ir trijuose seismiškai aktyviuose Naujosios Zelan-
dijos miestuose esančių 45 nuotekų pumpavimo stočių pažeidžiamumas per žemės drebėjimus. Įvertinus 
nustatyta, kad nuotekų pumpavimo stotyse labiausiai pažeidžiami yra nestruktūriniai elementai. Kadangi 
kai kuriose nuotekų pumpavimo stotyse struktūrų pažeidžiamumas yra didelis, reikia nedelsiant sudaryti 
rekonstrukcijos planą.
